
PHA · Pharmaceuticals
Field note · All industries
Reading IEC 62443 without a consultant
It usually starts with an email. A customer, an insurer or an auditor asks whether the plant "complies with 62443". Someone searches for it, and the first result is a list of a dozen documents with numbers that look like software versions.
IEC 62443 is a series, written over many years by people with different jobs, and only a few parts speak to the person who owns a plant. This note is a map: which documents to buy (they are published by IEC and ISA and they cost money), and which to leave on the shelf.
Four groups, one digit
The first digit after the hyphen tells you the group.
62443-1-x, general. Vocabulary and models. If you've wondered what the series means by zone, conduit or security level, the definitions live here. Most people open it only to settle an argument.
62443-2-x, policies and procedures. Written for organisations rather than networks: who is responsible, how risk is assessed, how patches and changes are handled, how service providers are managed. It reads most like a management standard, and it's the group an auditor is most likely to ask about.
62443-3-x, system. The plant network as a whole: how to split it into zones, how much protection each zone needs, and what a system must be able to do to get there. The most useful group for anyone drawing a network diagram.
62443-4-x, component. For the people who make equipment: controllers, HMIs, network devices, software. It covers how products should be developed and what security features they need. An owner doesn't need to read it, but a vendor should be able to show evidence against it.

Zones, conduits and security levels
A zone is a group of equipment with the same security needs, protected as one. A packing line and its HMIs might be one zone; the historian and its servers another; the engineering workstations a third. Drawing zones stops you treating every device as if it needs identical protection, which is impossible anyway.
A conduit is the path two zones use to talk: a firewall, a data diode, a VPN to a vendor, or on a flat network, simply the fact that everything can see everything. Naming the conduits is the more useful half of the exercise, because that's where the accidental connections hide.
The zones are usually what everyone expected. The conduits are where the surprises are.
A security level says how much deliberate misuse a zone should withstand. There are four, and they're easiest to picture as four kinds of person:
- Level 1: accidents and casual misuse. An operator who clicks the wrong thing; a contractor who plugs into the wrong port.
- Level 2: someone who means harm, with ordinary tools, little time and no special knowledge of control systems.
- Level 3: someone with real control-system skill, specific tools and moderate resources, who chose your plant on purpose.
- Level 4: the same again, with a large organisation behind them.
Where readers get lost. The series uses these levels three ways. A target level is what you decide a zone should reach. A capability level is what a product can reach if set up properly, the number a vendor will quote you. An achieved level is what a zone reaches today. The gap between target and achieved is the work.
Higher isn't better. Level 4 everywhere is neither affordable nor necessary. On a private industrial site most zones are sensibly targeted at level 2, with a few, often the safety systems and whatever the plant can't run without, at level 3. The plant makes that call, because only the plant knows what losing each zone would cost.
If you have a week, read three
62443-2-1, the programme. Roles, policies, risk assessment, changes and vendors. It describes a mature programme, not year one, so the sensible move is to note which elements you have, which you lack, and which matter most now.
62443-3-2, zones and risk. How to break the plant into zones and conduits, assess the risk to each, and set a target level for each. It turns a network diagram into a security design. Our method leans on it most, because you can't draw zones without knowing what's on the network.
62443-3-3, what a system must do. At least its list: identify who's on it, control what they can do, protect its own integrity, protect the data that matters, restrict what flows between zones, respond to events, and stay available. Each is described at every level, so you can see what level 2 asks of a packing line and what level 3 asks of a safety system.

Hand these to someone else
62443-4-1 and 4-2 are for your suppliers: how a product should be developed, and what a component must do at each level. You don't need to read them. You do need to ask a vendor, in writing, which capability level their product is certified to and by whom, and to notice when the answer goes vague.
62443-2-4 is for integrators and service providers. Hand it to the people who build and maintain your lines. When a machine builder says their remote-support connection is "fine", this is the part that says what fine would have to mean.
Everything else, the technical reports and the detailed parts on patching and metrics, is useful once the first three are in hand and rarely before. Reading them first is how people decide the series is impossible. It's long, and it was never meant to be read front to back.
Same order, every sector
The parts land differently by plant. In pharmaceuticals, 62443-2-1 sits comfortably beside an existing quality system, and the zones-and-conduits work in 3-2 can be done entirely passively, without opening a change control on a validated system. In manufacturing, 3-2 pays for itself: lines from several integrators have usually been joined for a reporting rollout, and drawing zones is the first time anyone writes down which line should talk to which.
Whatever the sector, the order holds. Know what's on the network. Draw zones around what's there. Set a target level per zone the plant can defend. Then read the requirements for that level, and only that level.
Sources
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